Ninety days into Operation Epic Fury, the Strait of Hormuz is not closed in the conventional sense — but it is not open either. According to a detailed operational assessment published by Windward, Iran has fundamentally restructured how the strait functions, shifting from outright closure to a permission-based control regime backed by an expanding IRGC small-craft presence and a parallel crude export channel that bypasses the strait entirely.
Commercial Traffic Has Collapsed
The scale of disruption is difficult to overstate. Windward reports that the pre-conflict baseline ran approximately 120 transits per day in both directions. As of day 89 of the conflict, that figure has fallen to roughly 6.9 transits per day — a collapse of approximately 94%.
The 84% reduction in large vessels physically present in the corridor, according to Windward, confirms this is a real disappearance of commercial traffic rather than an artifact of vessels switching off their AIS transponders.
What remains in the corridor is telling. Iranian-flagged vessels account for 46.4% of transits since February 28, according to Windward data. Comoros-flagged vessels represent 14.8%, Panama 10.2%, India 4.8%, and the Marshall Islands 2.8%. Western-controlled tonnage — the dominant share of pre-conflict traffic — is largely absent.
Three Phases, One Direction
Windward’s assessment divides the campaign into three distinct operational phases:
- Phase 1 (Feb 28 – Mar 26): Closure shock, defined by an opening wave of six near-simultaneous vessel strikes on March 1 and a near-total shutdown of commercial transit.
- Phase 2 (Mar 27 – Apr 7): Selective permission replaced total closure, with friendly-flag vessels hugging Iranian territorial waters while the broader global fleet remained frozen.
- Phase 3 (Apr 7 – present): Post-ceasefire fragility, in which the April 7 ceasefire reset rhetoric but not operational reality. Iran’s foreign minister declared the strait “completely open” on April 17 — a position reversed within 24 hours when IRGC gunboats fired on outbound transits.
More than 40 vessel incidents have been recorded since February 28, including strikes, firings upon, and seizures across approximately 42 named ships. Five vessels have been physically seized and diverted to Iranian custody.
Iran’s IRGC Presence Has Moved Into the Strait Body
The IRGC small-craft posture has undergone a significant shift, according to Windward. The early-May baseline ranged between 27 and 230 craft operating primarily along the Iranian coast. By May 12, the count surged to 668 craft, and on May 17, 392 unique craft were observed at sea — 369 of them concentrated in a single offshore polygon approximately 30 nautical miles northeast of Khasab, in open water.
Windward describes this as a shift from “patrol screen along the Iranian coast” to “active strait-body presence,” placing IRGC small-craft within visual range of every commercial transit lane across the corridor.
Two likely IRGC hovercraft were observed for the first time on May 22, extending the IRGC’s mobility profile into shallow-water and amphibious geometries, as Windward reports.
A Parallel Export Channel Is Taking Shape East of Hormuz
Perhaps the most structurally significant development of the three-month period is Iran’s construction of a crude export apparatus that bypasses the Strait of Hormuz entirely.
Windward reports that the Kuh Mubarak SPM exported zero barrels through November 2025 but has since lifted approximately 6.9 million barrels of Iranian Heavy crude, all destined for China. A new sequencing yard was observed on May 24 at Bandar-e Jask — approximately 50 nautical miles east of the Hormuz mouth — with three dark VLCC-class tankers at anchor.
Kharg Island, Iran’s principal export terminal, went dark on May 7 following an approximately 80,000-barrel oil slick from the western side of the facility. After a 13-day zero-lift gap — the longest of the campaign — the terminal cautiously restarted on May 20. A Suezmax was observed loading at the Kharg east terminal on May 25, described by Windward as the first major load since May 7.
Iranian floating storage currently stands at approximately 39.79 million barrels across 79 tankers, according to Vortexa data cited by Windward, down from approximately 150 million barrels at the start of the conflict. No Iran-trading laden crude tanker has arrived in Asia via the Malacca, Lombok, or Sunda Straits since May 4, according to Windward.
A Formalized Toll Regime
Iran has also moved to formalize administrative control of the strait. Windward reports that the Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA) went operationally live on May 18 and extended its claimed zone boundary to the UAE coast south of Fujairah on May 20. The strait is now functioning, in Windward’s assessment, not as a through-route but as a controlled corridor with a transit-toll regime layered on top.
Does This Matter to You?
This development carries direct operational and financial relevance across multiple areas of the maritime industry.
The 94% collapse in transit volume and the five-node container architecture now embedded across Salalah, Sohar, Khor Fakkan, Fujairah, and Jebel Ali represent a structural rerouting of global shipping that is reshaping route economics, bunkering demand patterns, and port call volumes across the region. The suspension of the U.S. Project Freedom escort corridor following the May 5 missile strike on CMA CGM SAN ANTONIO has removed what was a key risk mitigation option for vessels that had continued transiting.
The formalization of Iran’s PGSA toll regime introduces a novel administrative and legal dimension. Vessels operating near or within the claimed zone face potential enforcement action regardless of flag or cargo type, as demonstrated by the April 22 seizure wave and the May 14 boardings of HUI CHUAN and EDRIS.
The parallel Gulf of Oman export architecture — Kuh Mubarak, Bandar-e Jask, and Chabahar — and the expanding dark ship-to-ship transfer activity off Fujairah and Muscat are also relevant for compliance and sanctions exposure monitoring, given that multiple vessels involved have been identified as OFAC-sanctioned.
Windward notes that the ceasefire of April 7 and the May 23 announcement that a diplomatic agreement is “largely negotiated” have not altered the operational picture. The assessment concludes that the campaign has not de-escalated — it has restructured.
Gulf Bunkering does not provide operational or security guidance. This article is for informational purposes only. Operators should consult flag state authorities, P&I clubs, and relevant advisories for decisions relating to transit planning.
Sources: Windward Maritime AI™ Platform
