AIS-visible commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has dropped to near zero, even as dark vessel movements, position spoofing, and covert export activity continue beneath the surface. According to maritime intelligence firm Windward, the reporting period of June 11–14, 2026 captured one of the most constrained operational pictures yet recorded at the world’s most critical energy chokepoint.
Visible Traffic Collapses, But Covert Movement Continues
Windward reports that only one AIS-visible crossing was detected between June 11 and 12 — a likely vessel-supply run rather than a standard commercial transit. Between June 12 and 13, seven AIS-visible transits were recorded, followed by six between June 13 and 14. At the same time, EO satellite imagery confirmed at least one additional dark inbound transit during the same window, reinforcing that AIS data no longer captures the full picture of Strait activity.
Despite the suppression of visible traffic, Windward assessed that covert crude flows continue — though at volumes it describes as far below pre-conflict levels. Over the 30-day period ending mid-June, the firm estimates approximately 32 million barrels of crude moved through a combination of dark transits, ship-to-ship transfers, and Fujairah loading operations, equating to roughly 2.5 million barrels per day. That figure represents an estimated 10–12% of pre-conflict export levels at best, according to Windward.
IRGC Small-Craft Activity Surges
On June 14, Windward’s EO imagery documented a significant escalation in Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) small-craft deployments. According to the report, approximately 106 high-speed craft surged from the Khasab South staging node within a two-and-a-half-hour window, splitting into two groups to cover both the western approach and the northeastern choke point of the Strait simultaneously. Windward assessed this as a coordinated maritime-control posture rather than routine patrol activity.
Kharg Island: Crude Suspended, Sulphur Loading Advances
Kharg Island’s crude loading terminals remained empty across imagery collections on June 13 and 14, with approximately 23 tankers queuing offshore. Recurring oil slicks on both the eastern and western foreshore, Windward notes, point to a probable infrastructure fault rather than a single discharge event. Elevated support vessel activity across the island was described as consistent with a maintenance posture.
In contrast, a dark bulk carrier at Kharg’s LPG/Sulphur terminal was observed progressing through a sulphur loading cycle, with forward holds actively filling as of June 14. Windward assessed departure as imminent. The firm noted this is the first sulphur loading event recorded at the berth during the Operation Epic Fury window.
Spoofing, Blockade Breakers, and Shadow Fleet Activity
Windward identified six tankers broadcasting spoofed AIS positions in a tight cluster approximately 55 nautical miles southeast of the Strait, assessed as consistent with staging for transit. Four of the six are sanctioned under Iran programs.
The firm also assessed 19 vessels as potential blockade breakers operating a probable Iranian oil smuggling network in the Arabian Gulf. All 19 exhibited identity manipulation, fraudulent flag operations, and dark activity during May and June. Separately, eight vessels that loaded oil in Iran were identified in transit toward external markets, with several broadcasting false positions in the equatorial Atlantic — a pattern Windward describes as a classic GPS null-island spoofing artifact.
In European waters, the UK and France intercepted and detained the Russia-linked tanker SMYRTOS in the English Channel on June 14. Windward reports the vessel was operating under a Cameroon flag that had already been revoked, rendering it stateless under international maritime law. SMYRTOS is described as the 12th Russian shadow fleet tanker boarded by European or UK authorities in 2026.
Does This Matter to You?
The near-collapse of AIS-visible traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, combined with documented dark transits, tanker staging, and position spoofing, creates an environment of severely reduced maritime visibility at one of the world’s most consequential energy corridors. The crude export volumes Windward has tracked — roughly 10–12% of pre-conflict levels by its own estimate — point to substantial and ongoing disruption to oil flows that would ordinarily pass through this route. The growing prevalence of identity manipulation, shadow fleet activity, and enforcement-driven behavioral changes documented across both the Gulf region and European waters adds layers of compliance and operational complexity for those with exposure to vessel movements, cargo tracking, or counterparty risk in these areas.
Windward’s outlook characterizes the Strait as “operational, but only under severe constraint,” noting that it is “no longer operating as a conventional commercial corridor.”
Gulf Bunkering does not provide operational or security guidance. This article is for informational purposes only. Operators should consult flag state authorities, P&I clubs, and relevant advisories for decisions relating to transit planning.
Sources: Windward
