Iranian crude and condensate exports have fallen to their lowest level in over six years, according to maritime intelligence firm Windward, as U.S. blockade operations and enforcement against sanctioned tankers continue to intensify across the Strait of Hormuz and surrounding waters.
Exports Reach Six-Year Low
Citing data from commodity analytics firm Vortexa, Windward reports that Iranian crude and condensate exports dropped to 186,000 barrels per day in May — an 84% decline from April’s 1.1 million barrels per day and a sharp fall from nearly 1.7 million barrels per day recorded in March. According to Windward, this marks the lowest export level since February 2020, when the collapse in Chinese demand during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic dragged Iranian volumes to 168,000 barrels per day.
Windward’s analysis also notes that Iranian oil-on-water fell 30% over six weeks to 122.4 million barrels, and that no laden VLCC has reached the Strait of Malacca or the Riau archipelago — historically the primary floating storage and ship-to-ship transfer region for Iranian crude destined for China — since May 3.
U.S. Forces Disable MT LEXIE in Kinetic Enforcement Action
On June 2, U.S. CENTCOM conducted a Hellfire missile strike on the sanctioned tanker MT LEXIE in the Arabian Gulf, disabling the vessel after its crew ignored repeated military warnings over a 24-hour period as it transited toward Kharg Island. According to Windward, this marks the sixth commercial vessel disabled since blockade operations began on April 13.
MT LEXIE is described as a 332-metre crude oil tanker sanctioned by OFAC under Executive Order 13902 in March 2025. Windward reports the vessel had undergone four name changes, four flag changes, and five MMSI changes since 2020, and recorded 18 dark events in the six months prior — including a continuous 33-day dark period.
Following the strike, Windward identified 27 tankers in the Gulf of Oman sharing LEXIE’s profile of OFAC sanctions designation and fraudulent flag broadcast. Three were reported operating under active dark posture as of June 3. Windward assesses five vessels as near-operational clones of LEXIE and the highest interdiction-relevance candidates.
IRGC Strikes MSC SARISKA V Despite Disputed Ownership Claims
On June 1, IRGC forces struck the container vessel MSC SARISKA V in the Sea of Oman, with Iran characterising the attack as retaliation for a U.S. Navy interdiction of the Iranian-affiliated vessel LIANSTAR. Iran claimed the targeted vessel had links to the U.S. and Israel.
Windward’s ownership analysis does not support that claim. According to Windward, the registered owner is Panama-flagged and the ultimate beneficial owner, operator, and commercial controller are Swiss-based. The only nexus-country indicator identified was an indirect UK connection at the technical management level. Windward reports the vessel had conducted at least 15 transits through the Iranian EEZ between September 2025 and January 2026, with no port calls in U.S., Israeli, or UK waters during the same observation window.
Kharg Island Resumes Loading at Both Primary Terminals
Despite the broader export collapse, Windward reports that Kharg Island has resumed concurrent loading operations at both of its primary export terminals for the first time since late May. Earth observation imagery collected on June 2 confirmed a VLCC alongside the western Sea Island Terminal — the first confirmed vessel at the berth since an oil spill took the facility offline on May 5. By June 3, both terminals were reported active, with a VLCC at the western berth and a Panamax tanker at the eastern T-jetty.
Dark Fleet Staging and IRGC Activity Remain Elevated
Windward identifies continued dark tanker staging off Iran’s Gulf of Oman coastline, with eleven stationary tankers — assessed as seven VLCCs, two Suezmaxes, and two Aframaxes — observed off Bandar-e Jask and Kooh Mubarak on June 3, all operating without AIS transmission.
IRGCN small-craft activity across the Strait of Hormuz also remained elevated. On June 1, Windward identified two simultaneous high-speed craft swarms — one of approximately 30 craft at the central choke point and a second formation off the Omani Peninsula. Windward assesses the activity as consistent with surveillance, logistics support, and escort operations for Iranian-affiliated vessels.
A regional GPS jamming event on June 1 further complicated tracking, affecting 1,076 vessels and generating more than 123,000 false ship-to-ship encounters, according to Windward.
Does This Matter to You?
The developments reported by Windward have significant implications across the maritime and energy supply chain. The 84% month-on-month collapse in Iranian exports and the accompanying reorganisation of global crude flows — including record U.S. Gulf Coast exports and rising Saudi and UAE pipeline diversions — signal a material shift in the supply landscape affecting tanker routing, cargo availability, and commodity pricing.
The sustained use of kinetic enforcement against sanctioned tankers, combined with the identification of 27 vessels sharing LEXIE’s deceptive profile, raises the compliance and physical risk exposure for any vessel operating in or transiting the Gulf of Oman and Strait of Hormuz corridor. The IRGC strike on MSC SARISKA V — based on ownership claims Windward’s analysis does not support — further underscores that vessels transiting this region face targeting risk that may not correspond to actual ownership structures.
GPS jamming, widespread AIS suppression, and fraudulent flag broadcasts are collectively degrading the quality of maritime domain awareness, complicating due diligence and real-time tracking for operators, underwriters, and compliance teams monitoring vessel activity in the region.
Gulf Bunkering does not provide operational or security guidance. This article is for informational purposes only. Operators should consult flag state authorities, P&I clubs, and relevant advisories for decisions relating to transit planning.
Sources: Windward, Vortexa
