Commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has dropped to some of its lowest levels since the current conflict began, with only five AIS-visible transits recorded during the June 10–11 reporting period, according to maritime intelligence firm Windward.
A Corridor Under Severe Pressure
While Iranian officials have described the Strait as closed, Windward’s latest operational assessment paints a more complex picture. The waterway remains technically passable, but commercial movement has been reduced to a trickle under the combined weight of military enforcement, AIS suppression, and persistent dark fleet activity.
The five recorded transits — four outbound and one inbound — represented a second consecutive daily decline. All four outbound movements involved small coastal cargo vessels under 80 meters in length, while the single inbound transit was a regional shuttle vessel linking Sohar, Qatar, and the UAE.
IRGC Activity at Recent Peak
IRGC naval presence reached its highest recorded concentration in recent weeks during the same period. Windward identified more than 60 high-speed craft operating across the Strait on June 10, with approximately 50 of those craft moving westbound from Hormuz Island toward Qeshm Port in what analysts assessed as coordinated transit rather than standard patrol operations.
Additional small craft were observed along the southern Qeshm coastline and crossing the open Strait in relay-style formations between Iran and Oman.
Dark Fleet Activity Persists
Despite minimal visible commercial traffic, non-cooperative maritime activity continued throughout the reporting period. Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery collected on June 11 identified three dark vessel contacts operating inside the Strait’s deep-water channel, none of which were transmitting AIS signals at the time.
In the Larak-Qeshm channel, Windward observed 16 dark tankers holding position — including two VLCCs, one Suezmax, one Aframax, ten MR/LR tankers, and two smaller product tankers. An active ship-to-ship transfer between two approximately 170-meter dark tankers was also underway.
U.S. Forces Disable Two Tankers in Gulf of Oman
U.S. enforcement activity expanded geographically during the reporting period. According to Windward, U.S. CENTCOM reported that American forces disabled two Iran-linked tankers in the Gulf of Oman.
The Palau-flagged M/T SETTEBELLO, described by Windward as a known dark fleet tanker with a history of location spoofing and fraudulent registry documentation, was disabled after allegedly transporting Iranian oil in violation of the blockade.
The Guinea-Bissau-flagged M/T JALVEER was struck near Shinas, Oman on June 11 using two Hellfire missiles, according to CENTCOM as cited by Windward. A fire developed in the vessel’s engine room and funnel area. JALVEER had maintained an AIS blackout since May 26 and was associated with extensive ship-to-ship transfer activity.
Kharg Island Export Uncertainty Deepens
At Kharg Island, both crude terminals appeared empty in imagery collected on June 11 — the first time this has been observed since early June, according to Windward. Whether a previously berthed Panamax vessel completed loading before departing remains unconfirmed.
At the LPG and sulphur terminal, a bulk carrier was observed with a dark surface sheen extending into open water southeast of its berth, consistent with a possible spill. A tug was observed approaching at apparent emergency speed.
Does This Matter to You?
This situation carries direct relevance for anyone involved in energy supply chains, tanker movements, cargo routing, or maritime risk assessment connected to the Persian Gulf. The near-collapse of AIS-visible traffic through one of the world’s most critical energy chokepoints, combined with active kinetic enforcement against dark fleet vessels in the Gulf of Oman, signals a maritime environment where risk exposure extends well beyond the immediate conflict zone.
The continued staging of 16 dark tankers in the Larak-Qeshm channel, the potential spill at Kharg Island, and the geographic expansion of U.S. enforcement operations all represent developments with implications for cargo availability, vessel safety, insurance exposure, and route planning across the broader region.
Windward’s outlook characterizes Hormuz not as a closed waterway, but as an increasingly controlled corridor defined by surveillance, enforcement, concealment, and severely constrained commercial movement.
Gulf Bunkering does not provide operational or security guidance. This article is for informational purposes only. Operators should consult flag state authorities, P&I clubs, and relevant advisories for decisions relating to transit planning.
Sources: Windward
